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COULD CONSCIOUSNESS EMERGE FROM A MACHINE
LANGUAGE?
Genevieve H. Kaess
Abstract Behaviorists believe the following: if the output of
artificial intelligence could pass for human behavior, AI must be
treated as if it produces consciousness. I will argue that this is not
necessarily so. Behaviorism might be useful in the short term,
since we do not know what causes consciousness, but in the long
term it embodies an unnecessary hopelessness. I will attempt to
establish in this essay that certain empirical knowledge of
consciousness is within the realm of possibility. I will then use my
own definition of certain knowledge to shed light on ways in
which computer programming falls short of producing human-like
consciousness.
I. Introduction
―The best reason for believing that robots might someday
become conscious is that we human beings are conscious, and we
are a sort of robot ourselves.‖1 Daniel Dennett‘s offhand
introduction to his essay ―Consciousness in Human and Robot
Minds‖ serves more generally as a summary of popular
contemporary philosophical thought regarding artificial
intelligence: it is possible, in theory, because human intelligence is
1

Daniel C. Dennett, ―Consciousness in human and robot minds,‖ in Cognition,
Computation & Consciousness, ed. Masao Io, Yasushi Miyashitatt and Edmund
T. Rolls (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 17.
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possible. Human life, and consciousness with it, is no more than
the machinery of nature. What remains unclear is to what degree
(if at all) and in what ways the mechanisms that produce human
consciousness must be imitated in order to create artificial
consciousness, and whether knowledge of the creation of artificial
consciousness can ever be certain.
In this paper, I will argue that syntactical computer
modeling is not sufficient for artificial consciousness. I will
approach this point by first examining views of philosophers
(specifically Alan Turing and Hilary Putnam) who have suggested
behaviorism as the standard by which to judge consciousness in
artificial life. I will suggest that although behaviorism provides an
immediate solution to the problem of other minds, the adoption of
behaviorism as a long-term solution embodies an unnecessary
hopelessness regarding certain knowledge of consciousness.
Applying the same standards for certain knowledge that we do for
other phenomena, we can come to certain empirical knowledge of
the causation of consciousness. The rejection of this claim, I will
argue, is dualistic. Finally, using the standards that have
traditionally been sufficient for certain knowledge, I will explain
why one specific example (which I will discuss in section V) casts
doubt on the claim that AI can be achieved through computer
programming.
II. Definitions
For simplicity‘s sake, the term ―artificial intelligence‖ (AI)
will refer, in this paper, to artificial consciousness. Traditionally,
consciousness has been deemed an unnecessary (or at least not
necessarily necessary) condition for artificial intelligence. On the
145

contrary, I believe intelligence and consciousness to be
inextricably linked. Intelligence, by definition, is the capacity to
learn and understand2; understanding is a feature of consciousness.
Information processing, then, can only be qualified as intelligence
if it has conscious manifestation. Consciousness will be
understood (in this paper) as thoughts and emotions such as
humans experience them. I exclude non-human animal
consciousness from my definition because the goal of AI scientists
is to produce human-like intelligence (which, by my definition,
entails human-like consciousness). By limiting the scope of the
definition of AI in this way, a more comprehensible argument will
emerge; current knowledge of the nature of consciousness in other
organisms is imperfect, and any discussion of it would be based on
conjecture.
The science of AI depends on the truth of one basic
assumption: consciousness is a natural physical process. There is
no spiritual realm of thought that exists separately from nature;
therefore, provided limitless resources and a thorough
understanding of the mind, we would be able to reproduce it
artificially. Computational AI depends on the possibility that this
can be realized using computer programming. In this paper, I will
assume that AI is possible, but I will provide evidence that
computational AI is not. Henceforth, ―AI‖ will refer to
computational artificial consciousness, and ―computational

2

This definitiveness of this definition is disputable. However, there is no doubt
that this is one commonly used definition of ―intelligence.‖ Since I am merely
using it to justify my choice to define AI in the way that I do, and not as a
premise to any of my arguments, the definitiveness of my chosen definition is of
little consequence.
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functionalism‖ will be understood as the philosophical position
that such AI is obtainable.
To say that the creation of artificial intelligence can be fully
realized through computer programming is tantamount to saying
one of two things: (1) the human mind is itself nothing more than a
computer3 – an information processing tool – or (2) computer
programming and the mind can produce equivalent cognition
without holding any additional features in common. I will discuss
the second possibility in section VI. For the most part,
computational functionalists hold that the first is true: information
processing is the necessary feature of the mind. Certainly it is true
that the human brain has a biological medium distinct from that of
a computer, but that is all it is: a medium that realizes and supports
the brain‘s intrinsic informational processing. Human
consciousness, they believe, is a feature of the processes, not of the
medium.
Computer programming, at its most basic level, is a series
of 0s and 1s, which answer the question of whether or not various
features exist. I will refer to these 0s and 1s as ―computer syntax.‖
Computer syntax is itself a mechanical feature of the computer,
which is programmed in by humans. When prompted, it sets in
motion a series of mechanical events within the computer that lead
to the visible output on the screen or, in the case of AI, the
observable actions of a robot. The 1s and 0s can be combined in
very complex ways to produce impressive outcomes. In the
1950‘s, the research of Allen Newell and Herbert Simon suggested

3

John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1992).
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that ―a computer‘s strings of bits could be made to stand for
anything, including features of the real world, and that its programs
could be used as rules for relating these features.‖4
The idea for AI was not born solely of the impressive
capabilities of computers. It emerged also from the notion that
computer programming is the best model for the workings of the
brain. Most neurons give and receive signals in short blasts. They
operate under an all or nothing principle - either they‘re firing or
they‘re not. This is similar to the 1/0 duality of binary code. AI
scientists posited that these neuronal impulses could be modeled
by computer programming to the same effect: intelligence.
III. The Problem of Other Minds
But how would we know if that happened? Current
scientific knowledge does not account for consciousness. This is
called the ―problem of other minds,‖ and it is the foundation, as
well as the limiting factor, for philosophical arguments regarding
AI: we do not know what exactly consciousness is, and therefore
we cannot test for it in others. One can only be certain of one‘s
own consciousness. For some philosophers, this is grounds for
suggesting the adoption of a behavioral standard by which we
might judge what constitutes intelligence and what does not.
In his article ―Computing Machinery and Intelligence,‖
Alan Turing described his most lasting contribution to philosophy
– the ―Turing test.‖ Turing devised a game in which two people (a
man – ―A‖ – and a woman – ―B‖) sit in separate rooms as an

4

Hubert L. Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial
Reason (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), x.

148

interrogator questions them. All identifying features are hidden
from the interrogator. His goal is to determine which is the man
and which the woman; the goal of one of the two competitors is to
confuse the interrogator and the goal of the other is to help him.
Turing then posed the question: ―What will happen when a
machine takes the part of A in this game?‖5 The interrogator now
must determine which of the two is the machine. Turing asserted
that if a machine could win this game as frequently as the typical
human, it would be unfair to deny that it had consciousness. After
all, we do not require proof of consciousness in one another. Until
consciousness is de-mystified, Turing believed, we must adopt this
principle of equity.
Although the Turing test is not a definitive test for
consciousness, many have accepted it as the standard. We do not
have the knowledge to recognize consciousness in others; therefore
we are engaging in cognitive chauvinism if we suggest that a
machine with humanlike cognitive capabilities (insofar as they are
measurable) lacks consciousness. Turing‘s solution is pragmatic:
to avoid prejudice, we must judge consciousness in non-humans in
the same way we do in humans – behaviorally.6 The strength of
his position is that it is safe; it makes no conclusive claim about
what constitutes consciousness, but instead suggests the adoption
5

A.M. Turing, ―Computing Machinery and Intelligence,‖ Mind 59, no. 236
(1950): 434.
6
I would argue that we do not always usually use behavioral characteristics to
determine whether other humans are conscious. Instead, we assume that they
are conscious (because of their biological status as humans) regardless of
whether or not they could pass the Turing test. However, I will grant Turing this
point, since it is probably true that the reason we assume humans have
consciousness, even if they cannot pass a Turing test, is because as a general
rule, humans behave as if they are conscious.
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of a standard.
Hilary Putnam expressed slightly stronger opinions in his
essay, ―Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life‖: we cannot
expect to gain complete understanding of psychological states by
studying brain physiology. ―Psychological laws are only statistical
… to say that a man and a robot have the same ‗psychology‘ … is
to say that the behavior of the two species is most simply and
revealingly analyzed at the psychological level (in abstraction from
the details of the internal physical structure), in terms of the same
‗psychological states‘ and the same hypothetical parameters.‖7 For
example, anger is defined by one‘s claims and actions, not physical
brain states. It is identified by behavioral features, not biological
ones. This being the case, Putnam contended that ―it is …
necessary … that one be prepared to accept first-person statements
by other members of one‘s linguistic community involving these
predicates, at least when there is no special reason to distrust
them.‖8
Putnam constructed the following scenario to illustrate his
point: suppose that sometime in the future the robots we have
invented build robots of their own (Putnam calls these
―ROBOTS‖). The philosopher robots then sit around debating
whether or not ROBOTS have consciousness. This is akin to our
current actions. Since we do not understand consciousness, we
have no less duty to ascribe consciousness to robots than we do to
one another. The question of consciousness, Putnam concludes,
cannot currently be solved. Whether robots should be treated as if
7

Hilary Putnam, ―Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life,‖ The Journal
of Philosophy 61, no. 21 (1964): 677.
8
Putnam, Robots, 684.
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they have consciousness, then, ―calls for a decision and not for a
discovery. If we are to make a decision, it seems preferable … to
extend our concept so that robots are conscious – for
‗discrimination‘ based on the ‗softness‘ or ‗hardness‘ of the body
parts of a synthetic ‗organism‘ seems as silly as discriminatory
treatment of humans on the basis of skin color.‖9
The acceptance of a behavioral standard may be the most
appropriate immediate solution, but Turing and Putnam seem to
have been content to let it go at that. Turing declared the concept
of consciousness ―too meaningless to deserve discussion.‖10 They
adopted a perplexing stance for philosophers – agnosticism – and
many contemporary philosophers are happy to follow suit; debate
over consciousness is not just meaningless, they believe, but
impossible to resolve. The turn to behaviorism came not from
conviction of its worth, but from the lack of a better option. I will
argue that such a position of hopelessness is unnecessary;
consciousness can be known empirically.
The problem of other minds rests on the assumption that
consciousness is accessible only through first-hand experience.
But this is dualistic. If each person‘s consciousness exists only in a
special bubble that has no physical manifestation, then it is not
physical. To say that consciousness is both material in nature and
fundamentally undetectable is to make a claim that is dramatically
inconsistent with contemporary scientific thought. Substance is
thought to break down into particles that have both charge and
extension; if consciousness is material (an assumption required for

9

Putnam, Robots, 691.
Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 442.

10
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any form of artificial intelligence), it must be detectable at some
level if the detector knows where to look for it. But that is the
problem: how do we figure out what to look for when we don‘t
know what to look for? How do we make the connection between
objectively viewed matter and that which we experience as
consciousness?
Those who find the problem of other minds unsolvable
might answer that we need proof, and that proof is impossible.
First-hand experience cannot provide conclusive evidence
regarding the nature of consciousness. Self-reporting is not
sufficient for understanding of consciousness, because we are
unaware of the causal mechanisms within our own brains.
However, it seems to me that if we could thoroughly observe an
individual‘s brain in conjunction with honest reporting of his
mental states, we would discover much about the nature of
consciousness, and perhaps even its causation. Honesty cannot be
ensured for any given individual, but given numerous repetitions of
the experiment and the assumption that most people are honest,
useful data would emerge. For example, consider the following:
the materialist understanding of consciousness requires that it must
be possible, in theory, to replicate minds. This would be done,
perhaps, by tweaking one person‘s neurons in various ways until
the person had the personality, memories, etc. of another; the
purpose of this exercise would be to learn which changes in the
features of the brain are necessary for changes in consciousness.11
Depending on how we tweaked the neurons and to what effect, we
11

Obviously, there are ethical and practical barriers that would prevent the
manifestation of this scenario, but I intend it only as a hypothetical situation to
help illustrate my later point.
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could draw links between brain states and conscious experience,
from which we could conclusively accept or reject computational
functionalism.
One objection might be that hypothetical scenarios like this
one spawn sticky questions regarding personal identity. If my
consciousness changes entirely to that of another person, or even if
it just changes a little bit, do I really still exist or has my body just
taken on a new identity? If I cease to exist, then clearly I cannot
testify regarding certain knowledge of the change in my
consciousness, in which case the success of the experiment
(drawing links between consciousness and brain state) will depend
on correct behavioral analysis. If I claim to have experienced a
change from one personhood to another, in fact it suggests that I
have not experienced such a change; upon becoming the second
person, I would lose memory of the first. Even slight changes
might be impervious to awareness. If I lose a memory, for
example, and all memories of that memory, I cannot know that I
have lost it. Self-reporting, even combined with brain observation,
therefore becomes an inadequate method for the discovery of
mental causation and third-person reporting of consciousness is not
definitive. Furthermore, even if we do establish, using inductive
reasoning, that a certain change in the brain produces a certain
change in the nature of consciousness, it still does not speak to
whether that feature of the brain caused that moment of
consciousness itself. The brain might be an intermediate link in
the consciousness-producing causal chain. For some philosophers,
the lack of the plausibility of certain knowledge regarding the
causation of consciousness is reason enough to dismiss the entire
question.
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Those who get caught up on the problem of other minds are
forgetting one of life‘s early lessons: knowledge of causation in the
physical world is never certain. Young children often are
preoccupied by the question, ―Why?‖ Adults who are grilled by
these children are usually eventually reduced to the answer,
―Because that‘s just the way it is.‖ We can superficially
understand causation, but when we examine our understanding, it
becomes clear that all we actually do is recognize patterns. For
instance, we think we understand why a ball rolls (it was pushed)
and we think we understand why the push causes the ball to roll
(the transference of energy). For many of us, the understanding
ends there, but an expert in physics might be able to answer the
question ―why?‖ a few more times. Even our physics expert,
however, is eventually forced to concede a lack of understanding.
You do not wholly understand a cause if you do not understand the
cause of the cause. Furthermore, all of these alleged causal
understandings are actually theories based on induction. We
believe that if the ball is pushed (under certain conditions), it will
roll. But that belief is based on our repeated observation of this
phenomenon. We have merely recognized a pattern, and
concluded from it a causal relationship. Humans are only capable
of identifying correlation. Causation is supposed, never known.12
Furthermore, we assume similarity in internal structure in
entities that display similar characteristics. If a rat is born of a rat,
looks like a rat and acts like a rat, we feel certain that it has internal
organs much like those of other rats and we will come to
12

David Hume, ―An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,‖ in Modern
Philosophy: An Anthology of Primary Sources, Second Edition, ed. Roger Ariew
and Eric Watkins (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2009).
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conclusions based on this assumption. We believe in those
conclusions with such absolute certainty that we bet our lives on
them; rats are often used to test products to determine their safety
for humans. If we truly believed extreme variation in the physical
nature of rats possible, such tests would be worthless. Induction is
by its nature uncertain, but humans trust it.
If we adopt a standard for consciousness in the name of
objectivity, but refuse to accept that the causation of consciousness
can be understood empirically, we have, in fact, failed to view the
situation objectively. As the example of the rolling ball
demonstrated, inductive correlative reasoning is good enough to
use to identify other causal physical relationships. In the case of
the rolling ball, we have come to the inductive conclusion that
pushing the ball causes it to roll. If we repeatedly observe that a
certain brain state corresponds to a certain mental characteristic, it
is fair to assume causation, just as we assume that it is the push
that causes a ball to roll, not that the push was an intermediate link
in the causal chain13. Correlative evidence can demonstrate a link
(or lack thereof) between brain physiology and consciousness.
This evidence can be used to make conclusive claims about the
nature and causation of consciousness.
Of course, the problem is that we have not yet accumulated
enough correlative evidence to make conclusive claims about the
causation of consciousness. But the situation is not hopeless. By
adopting a position of behaviorism, one approaches this problem
13

Additionally, if brain states are intermediate links in the causality of
consciousness, then it is unlikely that syntactical modeling would produce
consciousness, since it models a feature of brain states and would therefore be
modeling an intermediate step.
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from the wrong angle. If you turn to robots for the answer to the
question of consciousness, you are looking in the wrong place.
Clearly, one cannot look into a robot to determine whether or not it
has consciousness. That would be like trying to determine whether
something plays music without any knowledge or understanding of
the nature of music. A more practical course of action is to look
for the root of consciousness, and to do that, it is far wiser to look
where we assume it does exist (in humans) than where we are
trying to create it (robots).
IV. On Correlation
Correlation can be used in two ways. First, as I have
suggested, positive correlation can lead to valid causal claims. If a
light turns on every time I flip a functioning light switch, I might
make the inductive claim that flipping a functional light switch
causes a light to turn on. Induction is useful, but not a logically
strong form of reasoning. It might be, for example, that one cause
has two effects, and I correlate the two effects to each other rather
than to their mutual cause. For example, a faulty light switch
might produce a spark immediately after I flip it, just before the
light turns on. I might induce that the spark causes the light to turn
on. This would have the same inductive validity as the claim that
flipping the switch turns on the light, but it would not be correct.
Negative correlation, however, is logically conclusive.
Only one instance of the correlation of A and B is required to
disprove the conditional statement, ―If A, then not B.‖ For
example, the belief that no dogs bite humans can be disproved by
the single instance of a dog biting a human. If use of computer
programming to produce AI tends to have human-like results in
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behavior, the behaviorist might inductively conclude that the two
are equivalent and computational functionalism correct. However,
it takes only one demonstration that the brain and the computer,
given equivalent structural changes, produce different results to
show that, at the very least, our current programming provides a
flawed model of the brain.
V. Implications for Artificial Intelligence
In Section III, it was established that the search for the root
of consciousness need not be futile so long as one is looking in the
right place: the human brain. When we pose the question of
whether AI might produce consciousness, it is important to recall
that most of the initial hope for AI stemmed from its similarity to
brain processes. Neurons send signals to one another with short
blasts of energy, which is in some ways similar to how computers
process binary code. However, it is important to note that this is
not strictly true. Not all neurons fire in short bursts; some send
longer signals not accounted for by computer syntax. Additionally,
neurons exist in a net, whereas binary programming is linear. In
his book What Computers Still Can‘t Do, Hubert Dreyfus
described the problem of ―know-how.‖ When a person becomes an
expert at a task, he no longer needs to think through all the steps of
the task, but rather the proper course of action is immediately
obvious. For example, a master chess player does not have to
think through the rules of the game before making a move, but
rather sees the position of the pieces on the board and knows
instantly what to do. By contrast, the more data the computer
chess player has about the game of chess, the more information it
will have to analyze before making a move. Although, in general,
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consciousness alone is a poor means for understanding underlying
mental causation, in this case it was indicative of an underlying
mechanism. Neuroscientists have explained the ―know-how‖
phenomenon by the fact that when two neurons are simultaneously
excited, the connection between them is strengthened.14 Newer
models of AI (―connectionist‖ models) have incorporated links like
these into programming, but they are poor models for neural nets.
Ultimately, even connectionist programming boils down to binary
code.
For the sake of argument, however, let us grant that
neuronal impulses are the source of consciousness and that binary
code is a decent model for them. The question now is whether
being a model is good enough to produce consciousness, or if there
is some further biological feature necessary. For binary code to
model neuronal information processing, one must be able to
imagine that at any given moment, the neurons of the brain can be
mapped syntactically. The alteration of patterns in binary code
must produce output to the alteration of neuronal patterns. A
recent study led by Mriganka Sur casts doubt on the causal nature
of brain structure. Sur and his colleagues performed surgery on
newborn ferrets,15 so that each had one eye that sprouted
connections into the part of the brain that is generally dedicated to
hearing (rather than into the visual thalamus and visual cortex).
14

Dreyfus, Hubert L. What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial
Reason. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.
15
Granted, I stated at the beginning of this paper that I was not going to tackle
the notion of animal consciousness. However, the scientific community often
extrapolates findings concerning animal physiology to humans, and I am
assuming that this study is accurate in suggesting that there would be similar
findings if we were to perform this study in humans.
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There was no resulting change in the ferrets; they continued to see
with the affected eyes, using the auditory portions of their brains.16
An immediate change in neuronal patterns (and in our imaginary
syntax which we have mapped onto the brain) produces no change
in consciousness. This suggests plasticity of consciousness that is
not observed in the output of AI. By comparison, it is difficult to
believe that significant change in syntax would not produce
observable change in computer function. In other words, in the
case of computer syntax, there is a conditional relationship: if there
is considerable change in syntax, there will be change in output.17
For neurons, we have seen the equivalent conditional statement
disproved. Here we have established lack of correlation between
the result of neuronal behavior and that of syntactical
programming; at the very least, we must conclude that current
efforts to use computer syntax to model brain functions are
fundamentally flawed. Just as a fundamental change in a recipe
would not necessarily produce an observable change in outcome,
but would very likely do so, this does not prove that syntax does
not produce consciousness, but it suggests as much.
VI. Discussion
We have established that if neuronal impulses and
syntactical programming each produce consciousness, they must
16

Alva Noe, Out of our Heads: Why You are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons
from the Biology of Consciousness (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009), 53-54.
17
One possible response to my argument would be a rejection of this claim. I
am not a computer scientist, so I cannot say with absolute certainty that such a
response would be unfounded. However, I think it is undisputable that if the
syntax experienced the same degree of change as the neuronal impulses in this
example, there would be noticeable change.
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do it in different ways. Stalwart defenders of AI might claim that
this is possible: that AI and the brain are fundamentally different
from one another, yet produce equally valid consciousness. To
defend themselves, they would likely revert to the problem of other
minds. However, as I have already claimed, the problem of other
minds should be dismissed as subjective. The claim that
consciousness could be formed in two completely different ways
is, first and foremost, unrealistic. It stems, I believe, from the
belief that consciousness is spiritual – that it rises above and
inhabits the physical world. If we instead accept consciousness for
what it is – a biological phenomenon – it seems no more likely that
computer programming (having proved dissimilar to the brain in
every important way) could produce it than any other biological
phenomenon (e.g. photosynthesis). Furthermore, if we reject the
spiritual view of consciousness, yet accept that consciousness
could be produced in a way that does not model the workings of
the brain, we have no basis to judge what is conscious and what is
not. The notion of consciousness becomes meaningless.
The conclusion to be drawn is that there is good reason to
believe that syntax based AI does not produce consciousness.
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